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REVENUE ANDWELFAREIMPLICATIONS OF A CAPITAL GAINS TAXCUT
WHEN GAINS REALIZATIONS ANDDIVIDENDPAYOUTS AREENDOGENOUS
ABSTRACT
This paper uses a general equilibrium model to simulate both the
effects of a preferential capital-gains tax rate on total income tax
revenues and the effects of a revenue-neutral substitution between a capital
gains preference and marginal income tax rates on economic efficiency and
the distribution of income. In the simulations, a capital gains preference
increases efficiency by reducing tax distortions between untaxed assets
(household and state and local capital) and taxable business sector assets
and between realized and unrealized capital gains (the "lock-in" effect),
but reduces efficiency by increasing tax distortions between corporate
dividends and retained earnings and between financial assets that produce
capital gain income and those that produce ordinary income. Because the
model treats aggregate factor supplies as fixed, however, the simulations do
not capture the efficiency gain from reducing the tax distortion between
current and future consumption or the loss from increasing the tax
distortion between current consumption and leisure (or untaxed labor).
The net estimated welfare effects depend on two parameters: the
elasticity of capital gains realizations with respect to a change in the
capital gains tax rate and the elasticity of the dividend-payout ratio with
respect to a change in the tax cost of dividends relative to retentions.
With no payout response, the net welfare effect from a 15% maximum rate on
capital gains is positive for a wide range of realizations elasticities.
With a high payout elasticity, the net welfare effect is slightly positive
for high estimates of the realizations elasticity and slightly negative for
low estimates of the realizations elasticity. The welfare changes, both
positive and negative, mainly affect taxpayers with income of $50,000 and
over.
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Columbus, OH 43210 New Zealand Columbus, OH 43210Under the U.S. income tax, as in most OECD countries, capital income
that people accrue in the form of increases in asset values (capital gains)
is taxed only when the gain is realized by sale or exchange. The taxation
of capital gains upon realization instead of accrual produces two sources of
efficiency loss. First, because tax liability is triggered by realizations,
the capital gains tax in its current form encourages taxpayers to hold onto
assets with accrued gains, instead of disposing of them by sale or exchange,
in order to compound income tax-free until realization. Further, under U.S.
law, the step-up in basis at death allows gains transferred by bequest to
escape income tax entirely. The result is a "lock-in" effect in which many
households hold suboptimal portfolios (in terms of higher risk or lower
productivity of assets to the household than to other households) to reduce
tax liability.1 One can usefully interpret the utility loss from lock-in to
a suboptimal portfolio as art implicit tax -- atax paid by the household but
not received by the tax collector.
Second, the ability of households to defer tax until realization
results in a lower effective tax rate on assets that produce capital gain
than on assets that produce ordinary income. This distorts the choice among
assets, leading to overinvestment in gains-producing assets, and induces
investors to incur transactions costs to convert ordinary income to capital
gain.2
Oneimportantsource of conversion of income to capital gain is the
substitution of corporate retained earnings for dividend payouts.
Households may prefer dividends to retained earnings because such payouts
convey useful information and increase shareholder control of the firm.2
The higher effective tax rate on dividends than on retained earnings,
however, reduces the desired payout rate. The optimal payout rate is one at
which the information (and other) benefits of an extra dollar of dividends
to shareholders exactly equals the marginal net tax costs of payouts to the
weighted average shareholder.3 Again, tax avoidance, through reduced
corporate payouts, has its cost in the form of an implicit tax.
A reduction in the tax rate on realized capital gains would lessen one
excess burden on households, by unlocking them from suboptimal portfolios,
but would increase another excess burden, by discouraging corporate payouts
(and, more generally, by encouraging taxpayers to incur costs to substitute
capital gains for ordinary income). The impact of a capital-gains tax rate
cut on these excess burdens, as well as on the Federal budget, the
efficiency of allocation of real capital, the level and allocation of risk
in the economy and the distribution of income, should be taken into account
when considering the wisdom of a capital-gains tax rate cut. Moreover,
measurement of all these impacts should allow for household portfolio
responses, capital stock reallocations, changes in the corporate debt-equity
ratio, and changes in the interest rate on Federal debt (Cook and O'Hare,
1987).
In this paper we calculate the impact of capital-gains tax rate cuts on
both the Federal budget and economic welfare by income class. The vehicle
for this calculation is an enhanced version of the Hendershott and Won
extension (1989b) of the Galper-Lucke-Toder general equilibrium model
(1988). The enhancement entails introducing utility-maximizing realization
and payout responses.4 The enhanced model incorporates all of the above3
noted behavioral responses and is parameterized to reflect alternative
recent empirical estimates of these responses to capital gains tax rates.5
Although the model incorporates many behavioral responses heretofore
not considered explicitly in analyses of the effects of capital gains taxes,
some important responses are not incorporated. In particular, the model we
use assumes fixed factor supplies. This means that changes in aggregate
saving, economic growth, and labor supply that may result from substitution
of labor income for capital income taxes are not considered. Nor do we
consider efficiency gains from less distortion of intertemporal consumption
or efficiency losses from more distortion of the choice between taxable and
untaxed work effort (home production and market production compensated via
tax-free fringe benefits). Thus, it is important to stress that the model
cannot assess the net welfare effect of changing the overall tax mix between
income and consumption taxes or between capital income taxes and wage taxes.
The model is appropriate for analyzing the combination of capital gains
tax cuts and general income tax rate increases (or decreases if the capital
gains cuts gain revenue) if one assumes either that aggregate factor supply
responses are negligible or that the welfare changes they cause cancel each
other out. If aggregate factor supply responses matter, then the more
appropriate use of the model is to assess the relative welfare effects of
alternative ways of lowering capital income taxes. For example, the model
can be used to assess the relative welfare effects of reducing the capital
gains tax or increasing allowable contributions to tax-free individual
retirement accounts.
The paper is divided into four sections. The first briefly describes
the underlying general equilibrium model. Section II discusses the
incorporation of capital-gains-realization and corporate-payout responses
into the model. The model simulations are reported in Section III, and the4
paper is summarized in Section IV. Appendices are included on estimation of
the payout equation and parameterization of the model.
I. The Modified Extended CEMDAT Model
GEMDAT (General Equilibrium Model of Differential Asset Taxation)
captures the interaction between differential tax treatments among assets
and differences in marginal tax rates among taxpayers. The particular
assets each household holds in its portfolio will reflect the pretax yields
on and tax treatment accorded alternative assets, the riskiness of these
assets, and the household's owntaxstatus and aversion to risk. At the same
time, household portfolio choices will influence market yields that in turn
determine the costs of capital to sectors issuing assets. These costs
determine tangible capital allocations and assets supplied to households.
Thus, the structure of GEMDAT emphasizes the simultaneous interaction among
household portfolio choices, business financing and real investment in
tangible capital.
The capital using sectors in the model are the corporate and
noncorporate business sectors (both of which produce marketable goods and
services), state and local governments, and 147 separate household "sectors"
that produce in-kind services from owner-occupied homes and from consumer
durables. Each of these sectors finances the capital it employs in
production by issuing financial assets that are absorbed in household
portfolios. The financial assets that households can acquire are: taxable
bonds (1), corporate equities (2), shares of noncorporate business divided
between rental housing (3) and other noncorporate (4), andtax-exempt bonds
(5). Capital is also used directly by households to produce services from
Owner-occupied houses and consumer durables.
The supply of financial assets issued to households depends on both the
demand for capital services in each sector and theway in which the capital
stock of that sector is financed. The sectoral demands for capital5
services, including those used directly in the household sector, are unit
elastic functions of the real costs of capital. The particular financial
assets issued to households vary by capital-using sector. Corporations
issue corporate equity, taxable bonds, and to a limited degree, tax-exempt
bonds. The corporate debt-equity ratio is determined by an optimizing
equation in which corporations balance the net tax benefits of debt finance
against leverage costs that vary directly with the share of capital that is
debt-financed; the corporate payout ratio comes from the balancing of the
information or other benefits from payouts against the extra taxes on
payouts versus retained earnings. Noncorporate enterprises issue shares in
unincorporated business, and state and local governments issue tax-exempt
bonds. In addition, the Federal government issues a fixed amount of taxable
bonds to finance cumulated deficits.
These financial assets are held by the 147 sample households, weighted
to represent the entire taxpaying population and disaggregated by labor
income (7 classes), capital income (7 classes), and tax filing status
(single, married or other). Households, solving a problem of portfolio
choice under uncertainty, decide whether to own or rent their housing and
allocate their fixed wealth among financial assets and household sector
capital (including owner-occupied houses and consumer durables).6 Demands
for risky assets vary directly with their after-tax expected return and
inversely with their after-tax variance, and demands for consumer durables
vary inversely with their opportunity cost (in most cases, the after-tax
interest rate).
The model contains a fairly detailed representation of the tax law.
Each sample household confronts the actual rate schedule for joint, single
or other returns, as applicable; tax liabilities are computed directly based
on gross income flows, exclusions, excess itemized deductions (if positive),
and personal exemptions. Taxable income includes all the income from wages6
and taxable bonds, but excludes a portion of income from corporate equity
and noncorporate capital and all the income from tax-exempt bonds, owner-
occupied houses, and consumer durables. The fractions of corporate equity
income and noncorporate capital income included in the personal income tax
base depend on tax law and household realization behavior (introduced
below). The separate corporate level tax is also represented in the model
and affects the relationship between the rate of return on corporate capital
before all taxes and rates of return to individuals who hold debt and equity
of corporations. The corporate income tax is described by two parameters- -
thestatutory corporate tax rate and the percentage of corporate economic
income included in the corporate tax base.
The net amount of each asset demanded by households is equal to the
amount supplied by capital-using sectors and the federal government. The
model solves simultaneously for the value of physical capital in each
productive sector, the share of corporate capital that is debt-financed
(debt-capital ratio), the corporate payout ratio, the fraction of each
household cell that owns instead of rents housing, the composition of each
household's portfolio of financial and physical assets, rates of return on
all assets, and after-tax income and taxes paid by each household (including
each household's allocated share of any corporate income taxes).
When the parameters that represent the tax law are changed, the model
solves for a new configuration of total capital stocks, household portfolio
holdings, and interest rates. (Aggregate supplies of capital/wealth and
labor are assumed to be fixed.) In the new equilibrium, financial asset
holdings and rates of return are again consistent with a single set of real
capital stocks and costs of capital in each capital-using sector. The
solution to a simulation also implies, for each household in the model,new
values of pretax income, taxes paid, after-tax income, and incomeadjusted
for the riskiness of the household's portfolio.7
II. Modelling Capital Gain Realizations and Corporate Payouts
This section discusses incorporation of capital-gains-realization and
corporate-payout responses into GEMDAT. Adding this behavior to the model
involves two steps: 1) specifying equations relating realizations and the
corporate payout rate to tax rates and 2) recovering from the realizations
and payout equations both the explicit tax rates and total tax burdens on
various assets. The latter includes explicit taxes and implicit taxes in
the form of welfare losses from tax-induced reductions in both gains
realizations and dividend payouts. The total tax burden is used in
equations explaining the portfolio demands for assets, while only the
explicit tax rates are used in calculating government revenue from taxation
of capital income. The realization equation relates the ratio of
realizations to accruals to the marginal tax rate on capital gains; the
corporate payout equation relates the fraction of earnings paid out to the
difference between the effective marginal tax rates
on dividends and retained earnings.
Realizations Equation
The realizations equation relates the ratio of realizations to accruals
(rr) to the marginal tax rate on realized capital gains (g). The
specific functional form assumed is
(1) ln(rr) —k0+k1g (k1<O),
where k0 and k1 are constants. The semi-log form has been used in
econometric work on capital gains realizations by Lindsey (1987), the
Congressional Budget Office (1988), Darby, Gillingham and Greenlees (1988),
and Auerbach (1989). This form has several appealing properties.7 First,
the (absolute value of the) elasticity of rr with respect to g increases
with increases in g, which conforms to prior beliefs about behavior.8
Second, as a result of the increasing elasticity, it is possible to
calculate a tax rate that maximizes revenue from realized capital gains.
This tax rate (g times rr) is g' —-1/k1.Je use g' as our index of the
responsiveness of realizations to capital gains tax rates; smaller values of
g' imply a larger realization response. Third, in contrast to a linear
form, the equation does not imply that rr goes to zero at moderately high
marginal tax rates; rr is always positive. For high absolute values of
k1,
however, rr can become very small. Fourth, in contrast to a log-log form,
the equation is defined at g —0.
The one disadvantage of the semi-log form is that it can imply values
of rr greater than 1, which would happen if there is asufficiently high
calibrated base case value of rr at a giveng and if the absolute value of
k1 is large. The parameter values have been chosen to make sure that this
does not happen; i.e., values are chosen such thatk0 is negative and thus
rr is less than 1.0 when g —0(see Appendix R).




The negative relation between rr andg is shown in Figure 1. In general, g'
will be assumed to be equal for all assets and allhouseholds; k0 will vary
across assets but not households. Of course, rr for a given asset willvary
across households because g varies.
Effective Tax Rates
To the extent that the investor is induced to lower realizationsin
response to high values of g, the tax burden imposed on him isgreater than
the actual tax paid. The totaltax burden per dollar of accrued gains9
equals the taxes paid, grr, plus the excess burden resulting from a sub-
optimal level of realizations. This total tax burden will affect the demand
for capital-gains producing assets.
We denote the total tax burden per dollar of accrued gains as grr* and








The total tax burden per dollar of accrued assets is shown in Figure 1 as
the sum of explicit taxes, area OrrBg (I), and implicit taxes or excess
burden, rrAB (II).
Given values of g' and k0, rr and rr* can be calculated from equations
(1') and (2') for any household given its value of g; g can vary across
different assets for a given household, and g for the same asset varies
across households that face different individual marginal tax rates on
ordinary income. When the tax law changes, new values of rr and rr* are
calculated based on the new g values. Because grr* affects demands for
capital-gains producing assets, changes in rr* can move households along
their marginal tax rate schedule to different values of g. That is, g and
rr* are simultaneously determined. We now turn to the relationship between
demands for capital gains producing assets and grr*.
Resyecification of Asset Demand Eauations
In the extended GENDAT model, three risky taxed assets exist:
corporate stocks, rental housing and equity in noncorporate nonhousing10
businesses. With zero covariances between returns, the utility-maximizing
share of a specific household's wealth in the kth risky asset can be derived
as the ratio of the difference between the expected after-tax rates of
return on that asset and the risk-free asset to the product of a risk
aversion parameter and the variance of the after-tax return on the risky
asset. The share in risky asset k is thus
(lakt)ik -(l_t)it
(3)Sk 2 2
where k is the expected pretax return,ak is the share of the return
subject to tax (see below), t is the household's marginal tax rate, the
yield on taxable risk-free bonds, or the expected pretax variance,a the
share of variance included in the tax base, and R is the product of the
household's degree of risk aversion, its utility per dollar of expected
income and its wealth.8
In GEMDAT, the taxes paid on a marginal dollar of income from the kth
asset are measured as
(4) a.Kt —Pkt+ (l-p)grr
where is the fraction of economic income on the kth asset that accrues
as annual taxable income to households and is the fraction that is
taxed only when realized by sale, exchange or other taxabledisposition.
In the original version of GEMDAT, theakt term was used in the portfolio
demand equation (3), andrrk was a constant.
For equity in noncorporate business, all recordednoninflationary
earnings are paid out by definition. However, inflationary gains are
deferred and not all noninflationary earningsare necessarily recorded
concurrently, but rather are deferred owing either to the generally11
favorable taxation of business activity (e.g., investment tax credits,
accelerated tax depreciation) or simply to the fundamental delayed nature of
their cash flows before someday showing up as capital gains. To illustrate,




where iis the nominal total return on rental housing, i - is the rh rh
noninflationary return, and dh -drhis the excess of the geometric-
equivalent tax depreciation rate (at replacement cost) over the economic
depreciation rate. That is, both inflation gains and earnings shielded by
excess tax depreciation are not recorded and thus not paid out.
For corporate stock, p is not the reported payout ratio because
reported earnings in the denominator of this calculation do not include
inflationary gains (earnings have been Corrected for the inventory and
capital consumption adjustments, IVA and CCA). The relevant payout measure
is the reported payout ratio multiplied by the ratio of real to nominal
returns to shareholders. The PC variable can thus be expressed as
(6) —p[i(lf)
-
wherep* is the reported dividend payout ratio, i is the return to
shareholders (before personal taxes --thek in equation 3), and f is the
debt-to-assets ratio for corporations. This relationship is simpler than
equation (5) because the corporate tax advantages (such as accelerated
depreciation) are already incorporated in
In this revision of the model, realizations are endogenous, and the akt
terms that affect portfolio demands include all factors that reduce the12
individual's perceived benefit from holding the asset, i.e., both explicit
taxes and the excess burden from reduced realizations to avoid the taxation
of realized capital gains. This excess burden is an implicit tax on returns
and reduces the value of the return to the investor even though it does not
generate revenue for the government. To incorporate implicit taxes, we
rewrite (4) as
(4a) at Pkt +(lP)grr,
where a is labelled the income inclusion rate for asset demands and is used
in equation (3) in place of a.K.
The Payout Equation
A single payout equation is specified for the corporate sector, just as
a single corporate debt-equity equation was specified in GEMDAT.9 This is
necessary, even though corporations clearly have different payout ratios,
because different types of shares with different dividend rates have not
been imputed to the various households in GENDAT. A disadvantage of this
approach is that most investors are out of equilibrium in the sense that,
given their tax rates, they would prefer to hold shares with higher or lower
payout rates than those available to them.
The single equation approach enables us to apply Poterba's (1987)
single dividend payout equation. Poterba estimates a long-run elasticity of
dividends with respect to the ratio of after-tax incomeper dollar of
dividends to after-tax income per dollar of retained earnings, where the tax
rate on retained earnings is grr. Empirically, the ratios are weighted
averages for all equity investors (individuals and pensions in our model) in
the economy.
We have reestimated Poterba's equation with two changes (see Appendix
A). First, we have expanded the tax rate on retainedearnings to include13
the excess burden or implicit taxes from delayed realizations, i.e.
•we
define the tax rate on retained earnings as grr*. Second, we havereplaced
Poterba's ratio of after-tax incomes per dollars of dividends and retained
earnings with the difference between the marginal tax rate on dividends and
our marginal tax rate on retained earnings. This difference is a direct
measure of the cost of dividends and facilitates the computation of the
utility loss from investors receiving fewer dividends than are desired.
The dividend payout ratio is expressed as
(6) ln p* —
c0+
c1DIVCOST (c1<O),
where DIVCOST —E - grr*,Ebeingthe average tax rate on dividends and
grr* the average tax rate on retained earnings, andc1 comes from the
estimation of the payout function and depends on the tax rate that maximizes
revenue from realized capital gains. Given a base line DIVCOST —
DIVCOST0
and p* —p,c0 can be paranieterized. A value of c0 < 0 insures that the
payout ratio would never exceed unity.
Utility Losses from Suboptjmal Payouts and the Demand for CorporateEuit
Investors experience a loss in utility to the extent that the dividend
payout ratio is less than the ratio that would result if DIVCOST were equal
to zero. We assume that all investors have the same demand schedule for
dividends, although desired dividends will be greater for those with lower
marginal tax rates. There is only one dividend payout ratio for the
corporate sector, however. Therefore, for any single investor, the dividend
payout ratio will not necessarily be the optimum ratio at which the marginal
reduction in utility loss from an additional dollar of dividends equals
DIVCOST, the marginal tax cost of an additional dollar of dividends.
The utility loss from reduced dividends is illustrated inFigure 2
as the area pAZ (I) between the payout demand schedule and the actualpayout14
ratio. This is the total amount of utility gain taxpayers would receive
from incremental dividends if DIVCOST were lowered to zero. Therefore, it
also approximately equals the total utility loss from the reduction in
dividends from the payout ratio associated with the excess tax on dividends
vis-a-vis retained earnings.
The utility loss can be expressed as the area under thepayout curve










These losses raise the effective tax rate oncorporate equities and
thus lower the demand for corporate stocks. The inclusionrate for
corporate stocks, a, is changed from equation (4a) to
(4b) at —Pct+(l-P)grr+UL.
For pensions and other zero-bracket investors, a't issimply UL.
III. Simulation Results
The extended GENDAT model is paraineterized basedupon 1985 asset
holdings, capital stocks and tax law. Thus the firststep in the analysis
is to simulate the impact of the 1986 TaxAct. These results are then taken
as the base from which the capital gains tax-rate reductionis presumed to
affect the economy. These results alsoprovide the basis upon which our 294
sample households (147 owners and renters) are combined in thetables to
present the portfolio responses in a meaningful fashion.15
Households have been divided into seven classes based on theirmarginal
tax bracket after adjustment to the 1986 Tax Act. Under the 1986Act, the
marginal tax rate rises as taxable income increases to 0.15, 0.28, 0.33, and
then falls to 0.28. Taxpayers with marginal tax rates ofzero, 0.33 and the
highest 0.28 form three classes, while the 0.15 and lower 0.28 classesare
divided roughly in half to form the other four classes:0.15L, 0.15H, 0.28L
and 0.28H. The 0.l5L bracket includes taxpayers witha marginal tax rate of
0.15 and income under $19,000 (single) or $38,000 (joint); the0.28L bracket
includes taxpayers with a tax rate of 0.28 and income under $38,000(single)
or $76,000 (joint).Income is the GLT concept: before-tax nominal economic
income, including before-tax profits of corporations allocatedby share
ownership of households, but excluding imputed rent on homes andconsumer
durables.
Table 1 contains background information on thepresumed starting point
for the capital gains tax cut simulation in the moderaterealization
response (g—0.29) case (without a payout response). That is, it shows how
wealth and its components are distributed acrossour seven tax bracket
classes after all adjustments to the 1986 Tax Actare completed (the eighth
line is the total for the economy). Part Agives the raw data; Part B shows
the percentage distribution of wealth for each tax-bracket classacross the
seven assets and within pensions; Part C shows thepercentage distribution
of each asset among taxpayers in the seven taxclasses; Part D, which
converts the tax bracket classes to income classes, shows in which income
range the tax bracket classes fall (those with single, including ocher, and
joint tax returns are considered separately). Part Egives the percentage
distributions of wealth for joint and single filersby income class.
The simulations of capital gain rate cutsare performed for two
alternative corporate payoutresponses and three household capital gains
realization responses. The twopayout responses are zero and the16
reestimated Poterba response (see Appendix A). The three realization
responses, reflecting different realization elasticity assumptions, are;
high (g' —0.18):based on Lindsey (1987),
medium (g'— 0.29): based on the Congressional Budget Office's (1988)
result that this rate is between 26 and 32 percent, and
low (g' —0.41):based on Auerbach's (1989) recent study.
Thus six sets of results are reported below.
Two alternative assumptions are made regarding the financing of the
gains rate cut. The first presumes that the gains rate cut is matched by a
cut in federal government spending (or an increase if the gains cut
increases government revenues). In this analysis the static and dynamic
impacts on the federal budget (changes in tax revenues and the interest on a
constant federal debt) are reported. The second assumption presumes that
the entire personal and corporate tax rate schedules are raised (or lowered)
slightly so as to maintain the federal budget at a constant level. The
extent of this change and the change in household welfare (risk-adjusted
after-all-tax income, including implicit taxes on realizations andpayouts)
are reported.
The precise tax cut analyzed is a cut in the maximum tax rate on
realized gains to 15 percent. That is, a capital gains exclusion (x) is
reintroduced where the exclusion rate for the jth household is x —1-
.15/ti.There are two advantages to analyzing the reduction to a maximum
rate rather than analyzing a flat exclusion. First, the stimulus to
portfolio responses are clear. Households in the 0.28 and 0.33 tax brackets
get the cuts while households in the 0.0 and 0.15 brackets don't. Second,
the cut dlrecth raises the welfare ofonly higher income households.
The realizations, payout, portfolio, revenue and welfareimpacts all
refer to the new long-run steady state. Thatis, they reflect a long-run17
steady-state increase in the ratio of realizations to accruals, not a
short-run unlocking effect.
A. Revenue Implications of a Gains Cut
Table 2-1 describes the tax law parameters for the gains cut (gains
rate lowered to 15 percent) in the moderate realization response case with
a fixed payout rate. For both 1986 tax law and "New law" (1986 law
including the gains rate cut), parameters given for corporate equity, rental
housing and other noncorporate capital includes the following for households
in the zero, 0.15, 0.28 and 0.33 percent tax brackets: the values ofg, rr,
rr*, ak for revenue (equation 4), a for demand (equation 4a), anda, the
inclusion rate on the variance of capital income (equation 3).
Table 2-2 shows the impact of the gains cut on pretax yields, capital
stocks, and the corporate debt-capital ratio assuming the moderate
realizations response and no payout response. The corporate equity rate
falls by 18 basis points, the noncorporate rates decline by seven basis
points, and the taxable and tax-exempt debt rates rise by six and two basis
points, respectively. As a result, there is a noticeable shift from
household capital ($48.7 billion) to business capital (mostly, $39.2
billion, corporate), but the shift is only one percent of the respective
10
capital stocks.
Table 2-3 contains the long-run impacts of the gains cut on the Federal
budget by tax bracket class. Column 1 shows a $5.75 billion static tax
revenue loss; column 2 indicates that this loss is cut to $1.88 billion when
a gains realization response is incorporated, but no interest rate, capital
stock, or portfolio responses are allowed. The remaining columns indicate
the results when all model responses are incorporated. Columns 5 and 6 show
a $0.86 billion rise in corporate tax receipts due to the reduction in the
corporate debt-capital ratio and the increase in the corporate capital
stock, but a $2.39 billion decline in personal tax receipts for a net18
decline of $1.53 billion. The next two columns indicate a $5.15 billion
drop in implicit taxes on realizations and no change (by assumption) in
implicit taxes on payouts. The last column shows that the higher taxable
bond rate increases federal interest payments by $786 million. Thus the
combination of higher Federal interest payments and lower tax revenues would
cause a budget shortfall (change in explicit taxes and interest payments) of
$2.32 billion.
Table 2-4 reports the portfolio shifts of the tax-bracket class
investors, both in dollars and in percentage points of wealth. High income
(tax bracket) investors increase their holdings of corporate equities by one
to two percentage points and of noncorporate equities by about aquarter
point, the shifts coming largely from taxable bonds. Lower income (tax
bracket) households engage in a reverse 0.8 to 1.6 percentage point shift
into taxable bonds, the shift coming roughly 50/50 from householdcapital
and equities. The gains tax cut explains --triggers--theshifts of the
high tax bracket households, and the resulting changes in pretax interest
rates explain the shifts of the low tax bracket households. Thisportfolio
shift, with higher bracket households more specialized in tax-preferred
assets, explains the induced decline in individual income tax revenues.
Tables 3-1 to 3-4 give the same results for the moderate realization
response case with endogenous payouts (p*). Table 3-2 indicates a slightly
smaller 14 basis point decline in the yield oncorporate equity, and thus
$7 billion smaller rise in corporate capital, anda sharp decline in the
payout rate from 0.75 to 0.69. The modified static revenue loss (including
only realization and payout responses) shown in Table 3-3 isa billion
dollars greater than the result withno payout response, and the dynamic
budget shortfall (decline in tax receipts plus increase in interest
payments) is increased by $1.5 billion to $3.89 billion.
The impacts on federalrevenues, the taxable bond rate and the
distribution of the real capital stock withhigh and low realization19
responses (with and without endogenous corporate payouts) are summarized in
Table 4. The greater is the realization response (the lower is g'), the
smaller is the revenue loss and the greater is the increase in corporate
capital. Twoportfolioresponses tend to offset each other, causing the
dynamic revenue loss to be approximately equal to the static loss. First,
the increase in taxed business capital at the expense of zero-taxed
household capital tends to raise tax revenues. Second, the portfolio shifts
among households cause a net revenue loss because the shift of high income
households out of fully taxable bonds and into both corporate and
noncorporate equities tends to lower tax revenue by more than the reverse
shift by low income households raises revenue)° With no payout response,
it would appear that the tax cut would gain revenues only if the tax rate
that maximizes revenue from realized capital gains were under 0.2.
With an endogenous payout response, the revenue losses are larger.
B. Welfare Implications





where V is a Cobb-Douglas function of outputs consumed,m0 is a constant,
and m1 is a parameter that represents the household's degree of risk




where Y is pretax income, TAXEX is explicit taxes, TAXIM is implicit taxes,
is an index of utility per dollar of expected consumption (and varies20
with changes in relative prices) and cy2 is the variance of the after-tax
income of the household.
Note that government spending does not appear in this function. Thus
welfare calculations cannot be performed in the model when government
spending changes. In order to provide such calculations, we finance the
gains tax rate cut (when the cut loses revenue) by increasing the .34
corporate and .28 and .33 personal tax rates proportionately (because
households in the .15 tax bracket do not get a capital gains rate cut, we do
not increase this rate). We do not mean to imply that this is the preferred
way to finance revenue shortfalls, but choose this method because it is the
standard differential incidence analysis of changes in the tax structure and
is what the model was designed to analyze.
Tables 5-1 to 5-5 are again for the moderate realization response case
with fixed corporate payouts, where federal budget neutrality is maintained
via a 0.95 percent increase in both personal and corporate income tax
schedules. The differences in interest rate and capital stock changes
relative to the case of no offsetting change in regular income tax rates
(Tables 2-1 to 2-4) are minor.
Table 5-5 indicates changes in welfare by both tax bracket and income
class. Referring to equation (10), the change in welfarecan be attributed
to changes in pretax income ('1), in explicitcorporate and personal taxes
(TAXEX), in implicit taxes on realizations and payouts (TAXIM), in relative
prices (m2) and in utility loss from risk (m1c2). The utility loss from
risk tends to increase in the simulations becauserisky business capital
increases relative to less risky household capital and becauserisk-bearing
is allocated less efficientlyamong households (high bracket investors are
induced by tax preferences to hold toolarge a share of risky assets and
thus bear too great a share of the risk from the uncertainreturns to the
capital stock).21
The impacts for the other realization and corporate payoutresponse
cases are summarized in Table 6. A number of points stand out. First, when
payouts are exogenous, a cut in the capital gains tax rate to a 15 percent
maximum increases welfare by 2.4 to 4.5 billion dollars. While thesegains
are not large, neither were the revenue losses (before compensating tax
rate changes) that were needed to generate them. For example, with g' —
0.29,the dynamic revenue loss (Table 4) was $2.3 billion, compared toa net
welfare gain of $2.8 billion (after accounting for the disutility associated
with higher marginal tax rates). Second, the source of the welfare increase
is the reduction in implicit taxes on realizations. The welfare increase
from this source more than offsets losses from increased misallocation of
risk-bearing and changes in relative prices.
When payouts are variable, the impact on welfare is effectively zero
(ranges from $1.4 billion to -$1.2 billion). The increase in the implicit
taxes on payouts owing to the decline in the payout ratio offsets 35 to 75
percent of the decrease in the implicit taxes on realizations. This, along
with the increase in explicit taxes and risk (there is more risky business
capital and less tax-free household capital) is sufficient to lead to a
decline in total welfare when the tax rate that maximizes revenue from
realized capital gains is above about 25 percent. However, even atg' —
0.41,the annual welfare loss is only $1.16.
Table 7 examines the changes in total welfare by tax bracket and income
class. With no payout response, the gainsgo predominately to higher income
households (94 percent to those with incomes over $50,000) if thegains
realization response is high. But if the realizationsresponse is low, the
gains are distributed evenly across income classes (those with incomes over
$50,000 receive only 39 percent of the gains). In spite of paying higher
(slightly) corporate taxes (via their stock holdings), households in the 15
percent tax bracket experience increases in welfare owing to increases in
the taxable bond rate and reduced risk taking (these households shift from22
equities to risk-free fully taxable bonds). With our payment response,
higher income households receive the welfare gains, if there are any, or
suffer the welfare losses.
IV. Summary
The simulations reported in this paper use a revised version of the
GENDAT model to assess the revenue and welfare effects of reducing the
taxation of capital gains. We modify the GEMDAT model by introducing capital
gains realizations and corporate payout responses. Households select the
ratio of realized gains to accrued gains to equalize the marginal benefit of
increased portfolio flexibility with the marginal cost of higher taxeson
realized capital gains. Corporations select a singlepayout ratio that
equalizes the weighted-average shareholder's marginal benefit ofpayouts and
marginal cost of additional dividend taxes (the explicit tax on dividends
less implicit and explicit taxes on accrued capitalgains). The equations
for capital gains realizations and the dividend-payout ratio thatare
consistent with such optimizing behavior are specified in accordance with
recent empirical estimates reported in the literature.
We simulate the effects of reducing capital gains taxesusing six
combinations of realizations and payoutresponses. For realizations, we use
three recent estimates from econometric studies ofcapital gains realizations
that imply that revenue from realized gains is maximizedat marginal tax
rates (g') ranging from 18 percent to 41percent. For payouts, we use a
reestimated equation from a recent study by James Poterba insome simulations
and assume no dividend-payoutresponse in other simulations.
In "modified static" simulations with nopayout response and no capital
allocation or portfolio responses, the impliedlong-run budgetary effects
from a cut in the maximum capitalgains tax rate to 15 percent range from a
$1.2 billion annual reduction in the deficit, wheng' —18percent, to a
$3.8 billion annual increase in the deficit, wheng' —41percent. The23
estimated effect on the deficit from a full simulation of GEMDAT (that
includes portfolio responses and capital allocation effects) is slightly less
favorable than in the "modified static" case. The difference between the
full model simulation and "modified static" estimates results from two
offsetting responses. First, the gains cut reallocates tangible capital from
household to business use, which increases tax revenue. Second, higher tax
bracket households shift their portfolios from fully-taxed bonds to
partially-taxed equities, while lower bracket households and pension funds do
the reverse. On balance, these portfolio shifts lower tax revenue.
A capital gains tax cut may decrease the corporate dividend-payout ratio
by raising the tax penalty associated with substitution of a dollar of
dividends for a dollar of retained earnings. In simulations with thepayout
response estimate based on Poterba (1987), lowering the capital gains tax
rate to 15 percent increases the budget deficit for all realizationsresponse
and reduces annual revenue in the full model simulations by about $1.5
billion.
The revenue estimates are not strictly comparable to official revenue
estimates of either the Treasury or the Joint Tax Committee. This is because
the baseline data we use is for tax year 1985, modified by a simulation of
the Tax Reform Act of 1986, and does not incorporate all features of
government data bases. Our estimates also do not take account of the effects
of different effective dates and the timing ofresponse in the first few
years after the tax change. What is relevant from our estimates is the
comparisons among the static, "modified static", and full model simulation
results. These results show the extent to which different behavioral
responses either offset, or magnify, the long-run annual static revenue loss
from lowering the tax rate on capital gains.
The results reported in this paper are also dependenton the specific
form of the capital gains cut we simulate. A reduction in themarginal tax
rate on realized gains to 20 percent would have a more favorable effecton24
the deficit than a cut to 15 percent. On the other hand, an across-the-board
exclusion rate on capital gains for all households (including those in the 15
percent bracket) would increase the deficit more than a reduction to a
maximum flat rate.
We simulate the effects of reducing the capital gains tax on economic
efficiency in a budget-neutral context. Budget neutrality is maintained in
the simulations by adjusting statutory marginal tax rate on ordinary income
in the 28 percent and 33 percent brackets by a constant proportion.
The effects on net economic welfare of reducing the capital gains tax
are more likely to be positive than are the effects on revenue because the
reduction of the economic distortion due to lock-in is significant even in
cases where tax cuts reduce the revenue from capital gains taxes. The net
welfare effect we estimate is sensitive to the specification of the corporate
payout response. In cases where we assume no payout response, lowering the
capital gains tax results in an annual welfare gain for all three realization
response assumptions. The gain ranges from $2.4 billion (for g' —41
percent) to $4.5 billion (for g' —18percent). In contrast, in simulations
with a payout response, the results are mixed. The net welfare effect ranges
from a gain of $1.4 billion (for g' —18percent) to a loss of $1.2 billion
(for g' —41percent).
The estimates of economic efficiency effects are incomplete because they
do not account for all possible behavioral responses thatmay result from
changes in the structure of the income tax. We must emphasize in particular
that GE14DAT assumes fixed aggregate factor supplies (although factors are
highly mobile between sectors). This means that the model cannot be used to
assess the net efficiency consequences of shifting the tax burden from
capital income to labor income. Aside from intertemporal consumption and
labor supply effects, however, the results of the simulations provide useful
insights on the intersectoral efficiency gains and losses from reducing
capital income taxes in the form of a capital gains differential.25
Appendix: Parameterization of the Model
The Constant Terms (k0) in the Realization Equations;
The return on an asset consists of two parts -- animmediately
taxable return (dividends, in the case of corporate shares; taxable income
in the case of noncorporate business) and a tax-deferred return (retained
earnings in the case of corporate shares). The entire pretax return is
either retained or reinvested in the asset every year; the basis is
increased every year by the sum of reinvested earnings (dividends plus
realized capital gains). Each portfolio of assets is divided into two
parts -- assetswith a positive annual realizations rate (traded
portfolios) and assets with a realizations rate of zero that are simply
held to death (not traded portfolios). The stock of accrued gains on the
traded portfolio is the difference between the total value of the portfolio
and the cost basis. Every year the taxpayer sells a constantpercentage of
his traded portfolio and realizes a constant percentage of accrued gains.
At the end of 40 years, the basis is stepped up to the market value, but
the difference between the market value and the cost basis at the end of
the year is not taxed (except for the normal realized gain).
We calculate the ratio of the present value of the sum of realized
gains to the present value of the suni of accrued gains over 40 years for
the traded portfolio. (For the nontraded portfolio, this ratio is zero.)
The ratio for traded assets multiplied by the share of assets that are
traded is the inclusion rate (a,) in equation (3). Note that the step-up
in basis at death lowers the inclusion rate both directly and indirectly.
The direct effect is that the inclusion rate on assets held until death is
zero. The indirect effect occurs because, at the end of 40 years, the
basis on traded assets rises to the market value and the stock of accrued
gains falls to zero. This means that the ratio of annual realized gains to
annual accrued income at the beginning of the 40-year period is lower than26
its long-run steady state value, thereby resulting in a lower present value
of the ratio of the sum of realizations to the sum of accruals for traded
assets over the entire period.
For traded corporate equities, we assume a seven-year holding period
(1/7 of the traded portfolio is sold each year). We also assume that 75
percent of assets are in the traded portfolio, and we use a discount rate
of 0.1128. The resulting long-run ratio of the present value of
realizations to accruals (rr0) is 0.4156, which we round off to 0.4. For
rental housing, we raise the percentage of assets in the traded portfolio
to 80 percent and the discount rate to 0.1443, and we calculate anrr0 of
0.4163, which we also round off to 0.4. We consider nonhousing
noncorporate assets to consist of two equal parts: commercial real estate
and expersed assets, both with discount rates of 0.1780. The holding
period and fraction of assets traded for commercial is the same as rental;
for expensed capital, we assume a ten-year holding period and 60 percent of
assets in the traded portfolio. The resulting rr0 is 0.3848 for commercial
real estate and 0.2318 for expensed assets, giving an average for
nonhousing noncorporate capital of 0.3083, which we round off to 0.3.
To calculate the k0's we need tax rates to go with theserr0 values.
For the regular marginal income tax rate, we use the weightedaverage tax
rates under 1985 tax law for GEMDAT investors in corporate equities, rental
housing and nonhousing noncorporate. These are 0.395 for corporate
equities, 0.387 for rental housing and 0.307 for nonhousing noncorporate.
The relationships between the capital gains tax rates and the regular tax
rates are described below. With these relationships, thek0's for g' —
0.18are -0.0374 for corporate equities, -0.0287 for rental housing and
-0.5414 for other noncorporate. For g' —0.29,the respective k0's are27
-0.3708, -0.3654, and -0.7927; for g' —0.41,the k0's are -0.5309,
-0.5267, and -0.9131.
Noncororate Payout Ratios and Capital Gains Tax Rates:
As noted in the text, the payout ratio for noncorporate investments
N
is given by p — - (d*-d)-'k'where d* —(ik1r+d)E TAXD /(1+ik)i,
i—i j
TAXD is tax depreciation per dollar of assets and N is the tax life of the
assets. For rental housing, d* -d—0.0305under 1985 law and 0.0073
under 1989 law. For commercial real estate, d* -d—0.0232and 0.0034.
With expensed assets, ETAXDi/(l+ik)i —1,which implies that p —0.Using
these values and the assumed ik'S, p for rental housing rose from 0.5462
under 1985 tax law to 0.7067 under the 1986 law. For nonhousing
noncorporate (an average for the commercial and expensed assets), the
increase was from 0.3364 to 0.3921.
For corporate equities and expensed capital, the capital gains tax
rate, g, is simply (1-x)t, where x is the exclusion rate. Further, under a
tax law lowering the gains rate to a maximum level, such as that analyzed
in this paper, x —1-t/t, where t is the maximum level. max max
Depreciable real estate is different for two reasons. First, trading
before the end of the tax life can generate recapture of accelerated
depreciation as ordinary income. Second, trading allows establishment of a
higher basis upon which depreciation can again be taken. The former
increases the effective tax rate and the latter lowers it. For depreciable
real estate, we compute the gains tax rate as
g —[l-x(1-Recap)-zjt,
where recap is the ratio of the recapture of accelerated depreciation upon
sale assuming a seven-year holding period to the taxable gain upon sale and28
z is the ratio of the present value of the net additional tax depreciation
created by the sale to the taxable gain. The 1985 values for rental
housing are recap —0.2370and z —0.1290.For 1986 law, recap —0.0and z
—0.0129.Under both laws, recap is zero for coimnercial real estate. For
1985 law, z —0.0233;for 1986 law, z —0.0052.The z values for
northousing noncorporate are half of those for conunercial real estate.
The Corporate Payout Ratio:
Pocerba (1987) estimates an equation of the form:
(Al) ln (D/Di) —d0+d1ln(Y/Y1)+d2ln(et/9 +d3ln(D1)
+d4ln(Yi)+d5ln(8i)+d6DIVCON,
where D —dividends,Y —corporateaccounting earnings adjusted for CCA and IVA,
9 —theratio of after-tax income per dollar of dividends to after-tax income
per dollar of retained earnings, DIVCON is a dummy variable that is 1 in years
when there were dividend payment controls (1972-74) and 0 in otheryears, d0
d6 are constants, and the subscripts tandt-l refer to current period and
one-year lagged values, respectively.
The 9 variable is a weighted average of &forall individuals j,
whichare computed as
(A2) —(1-MTRDIv)/(1-MT1wNsi)
where MTRDIV —themarginal tax rate on dividends and MTRACNS —the
marginal tax rate on accrued capital gains. It is assumed implicitly that
a dollar of retained earnings results in an additional dollar ofexpected
accrued capital gains. Poterba defines MTRAGNSas grr, with rr —0.25.29
We use girr*i (equ. 2' in the text), with rr endogenous (equ. 1' in the
text).
The long-run elasticity of D with respect to e derived from the
estimated coefficients of equation (Al) does not tell us directly how much
a given change in the "cost" of dividends affects the dividendpayout ratio
because the cost of dividends is directly measured by the difference
between the marginal tax rate on dividends and the marginal tax rateon
retained earnings (DIVCOST), not by the ratio of after-tax returnson
dividends and retained earnings (8). While DIVCOST and 8 are correlated
with each other over time, there is not a one-to-one correspondence between
them. The same value of 8 can be associated with different values of
DIVCOST if it results from different combinations of thetaxpayer's
marginal tax rate on ordinary income and percentage of accrued capital
gains excluded from taxable income.
DIVCOST is a weighted average of DIVCOST among all taxpayers where
(A3) DIVCOST —MTRDIV-MTRACNS3.
We recalculated DIVCOST for individual investors using a weightedaverage
of the marginal tax rates on dividends and accrued gains for individual
taxpayers. DIVCOST for all investors is then equal to DIVCOST for
individual investors multiplied by the share of corporate equity held by
individuals because DIVCOST —0for pension funds (in contrast, 8 —Ifor
pension funds).
When we estimate equation (Al) with DIVCOST substituted for 8, the
long-run estimate of the percentage change in the dividend payout ratio per
unit change in the price of dividends (DIVCOST) is equal to -4.77 for the
high realizations response case, -4.66 for the medium response, -4.60 with
a low response and -4.53 in the case of no realizations response.30
These responses are the c1's in equation (6). To paraineterize c0 we
need to set base case values for p* and DIVCOST. We set p* equal to 0.56,
the average value of the payout ratio for 1984-86, and use the weighted
average marginal tax rate and marginal gains tax rate under 1985 tax law
for GEMDAT investors (including pensions) in corporate equities to compute
DIVCOST. The marginal tax rates depend on the assumed realizations rate
for capital gains. In the medium response case, the average tax rates are
0.294 and 0.066, respectively, giving DIVCOST —0.230.Substituting these
numbers in equation (6), c0 —0.49,which implies a payout ratio of 1.6
when DIVCOST —0.
To avoid a payout ratio in excess of unity, we set c0 —0and solve
equation (6) for c1, when DIVCOST —0.230.The result is c1 —-2.52,or
only about half the estimated value. With the high realization response
case, DIVCOST —0.214and c1 —-2.71;with the low realization response
case, DIVCOST —0.237and c1 —-2.45.Using these values of c1 implies
payout responses to the capital gains tax cut that are more in line with
the estimated relationship of the payout rate to e than to DIVCOST.31
Footnotes
1Auerbach (1989) notes thatoptimal tax planning might lead households to
time realizations of losses and gains to avoid gains taxescostlessly. He
also reports evidence that households do not do this in amajor way and thus
that the efficiency losses owing to "lock-ins' are important.Also, see
Poterba (1987b).
2See Poterba (l987a,p. 471) and references cited therein. While none of the
explanations of dividend behavior are fully satisfactory from a theoretical
point of view, we follow Poterba in assuming that there is something about
dividends that makes shareholders want them in spite of their taxation.
3The marginal net taxcost of payouts is the difference between the marginal
tax rate on dividends and the marginal tax rate on retained earnings, where
the latter includes both the explicit tax on realized gains and theimplicit
tax from lock-in.
4See Hendershott and Won(l989a) for a first attempt at estimating the
revenue implications of capital gains tax rate cuts using the original GLT
model.
5Lindsey (1987), the CongressionalBudget Office (1988), Auerbach (1989) and
others successfully relate capital gains realizations to capital gains tax
rates, although the estimated responses vary widely (see the discussion in
the text). Poterba (l987a) estimates a significant link betweencorporate
payouts and the ratio of after-tax income per dollar of dividends to after-
tax income per dollar of retained earnings.
order to simplify the calculations, tenure choice is held constant in the
simulations reported below. Given the nature of the tax change analyzed, the
impact on tenure would be miniscule.32
minor technical disadvantage of the logarithmic form is that the time
series estimates of the aggregate response do not translate into exactly the
same response for individual taxpayers because logarithmic changes are not
additive. That is, the total realizations response calculated by adding up
individual responses to changes in marginal tax rates will not add up exactly
to the predicted total response from applying the same coefficient estimate
to the average change in marginal tax rates among taxpayers. This bias in
applying aggregate time series estimates to a microsimulation has been noted
in Darby, Gillingham, and Greenlees (1988). CBO (1989) simulated both the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 and the 15 percent capital gains tax rate proposal and
found that the quantitative magnitude of this bias is insignificant. CBO
computed aggregation error from applying the coefficient estimate for the
entire sample to compute the response for each taxpayer reporting capital
gains in a sample of 80,000 individual income returns. The predicted capital
gains realizations from summing among individuals was within 1 percent of
realizations predicted by the aggregate equation for both simulations.
8Thjs is a simplified version of theshare equations. The most important
omission is a term that captures the impact of the variance ingovernment tax
revenues owing to the variance in revenues from the asset (see Hendershott
and Won, 1989b, for the precise form of the asset shareequations).
9Corporate share repurchasesare not included in the model.
10While householdcapital declines here, in a growth context the one percent
decline would translate into a less than one-tenth ofa percentage point
slower annual growth in household capitalover several decades.
11Only the reallocation effectoccurred in simulations with the original
Galper-Lucke..Toder model with three riskyassets, and thus the dynamic
revenue losses were significantly less than the static losses(Hendershott
and Won, l989a).33
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D. DISTR:BOTI0N OF HOUSEHOLDS
INCOME*0%S0% J 15% S
<1012581.0 0.0 0.0
10—20 0.0 6927.0 14912.4
20—302.6 3227.5 8302.3
30 —50 0.3 0.0966.1
50—100 0.0 0.0 16.2
100—200 0.) 0.0 0.0













































































TABLE 1: POST1986TAXACTDISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH AND ITS COMPONENTS




















































































*pRTAX NOMINAL INCOME EXCLUDING IMPUTED INCOME FROM OWNER-OCCUPIED
HOUSING AND CONSUMER DURABLES
E. PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL WEALTH AND ITS COMPONENTS ACROSS ASSET TYPES
(JOINT FILER)
INCOMEWEALTHTAXABLEPENSION CORP.RENTAL OTHER TAX OWNER
BRACKET BOND STOCK HOUSING NONCORP.EXEMPTSHOUSING <.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10 —20100.00-48.9433.61 1.76 2.9016.65 0.00 71.24 20 -30100.00-18.0921.49 5.00 8.8226.23 0.46 41.12 30 -50100.00-17.2625.74 5.61 7.00 8.97 1.50 46.57 50 —100100.0017.0416.88 13.87 8.18 9.08 1.95 22.31 100—200100.0021.75 8.8924.57 9.23 9.84 7.17 12.73 >200100.0021.31 5.6528.57 14,2011.75 9.55 6.13
TOTAL 100.00 4.5416.64 14.65 9.19 12.62 3.65 26.98
(SINGLE AND OTHER FILERS)
INCOME WEALTH TAXABLE PENSION CORP. RENTAL OTHER TAX OWNER
BRACKET BOND STOCK HOUSING NONCORP. EXEMPTS H:)USING <10 100.00-96.31 15.09 0.89 1.26 2.39 0.05 .59.65
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TABLE2-3:IMPACT ON INCOME ANDTAXES,DIFFERENCES FROM 1986 IN MILLION $
(G' 0.29, PAYOUT=0.56)
STATIC POST TAXY DYNAMIC
TAX
RATEPURE MODIFIEDPOST TAXPRETAX CORPINDIV RR I Y TAXESTAXESTAXES
0.0 0 0 —524-1037 -367 -146 3
0. 15L 3 3 -1017-2225 —960 -248 -20
0. 15H 0 0 —620—1297 —585 —92 —12 0
O.28L 470 165 616 866 349 -100 -403 0
0.28H1425 501 974 987 506 -493—1170 0
0.332296 662 2146 3076 1588 —658—2259 0
0.28 1561 549 765 444 326 -647—1287 0






*IN THE ABSENSE OF ROUNDING ERRORS, THE IMPACTS ON PRETAX I AND FEDERAL
INTEREST WOULD BE EQUAL.
TABLE2-4: PORTFOLIO SHIFTS IN RESPONSE TO GAINS TAXCUT,BILLIONS OF













TAXABLE CORP. TOTAL TAXHOUSEHOLD
BOND STOCKNONCORP.EXEMPTSCAP I TAL
12.8 -4.2 -3.0 0.0 -5.6
27.7 —11.4 —6.8 0.1 —9.5
13.9 -3.3 —3.4 —0.4 -6.8
—9.2 16.5 3.3 -0.6 —9.9
-19.8 24.1 4.3 -0.7 —8.0
-51.7 51.8 11.7 -2.7 -9.2
—20.5 14.5 6.2 —0.4 0.3
-46.9 87.9 12.4 -4.7 -48.7
PERCENTAGE POINT PORTFOLIO SHIFTS ACROSS ASSET TYPES
TAX TAXABLE CORP. TOTAL TAX HOUSEHOLD
RATE BONDSTOCK CAPITAL
0.0 1.60-0.53 —0.70
0.ISL 1.62 -0.67 —0.55
0.1SH 0.80 -0.19 -0.39
0.28L -0.75 1.33 —0.80
0.28H -0.89 1.08 -0.36
0.33 -1.88 1.89 -0.34
0.28 —1.45 1.02 0.02












PORTFOLIO SHIFTS ACROSS HOUSEHOLD CLASSES

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TABLE3-3: IMPACT ON INCOME ANDTAXES,DIFFERENCES FROM 1986 IN MILLION $
(G=0.29, PAYOUT= END)




POST TAXPRETAX CORPINDIV RR PAYFEDERAL
Y Y TAXES TAXESTAXES TAXES INTEREST
0.0 0 1 -543—1154 -464 -146 0 5
0.ISL 0 23 -1172—2827—1382 -273 -6 58
0.15H 0 77 -632—1651-837 —182 25 220
0.28L 536 229 731 1092 507 -147 -406 1:9
0.28H1434 760 1228 777 479-930 -861 441



















*IN THE ABSENSE OF ROUNDING ERRORS, THE IMPACTS ON PRETAXY ANDFEDERAL
INTEREST WOULDBEEQUAL.
TABLE 3-4: PORTFOLIO SHIFTS IN RESPONSE TO GAINS TAXCUT,BILLIONSOF
DOLLARS ANDPERCENTAGE POINTS(G'= 0.29, PAYOUT=END)
DOLLAR PORTFOLIOSHIFTS (BILLION S)
TAX TAXABLE CORP. TOTAL TAXHOUSEHOLD
RATE BOND STOCKNONCORP. EXEMPTSCAPITAL
0.0 13.3 -5.4 —2.9 0.0 —5.0
0.1SL 33.5 —18.7 -6.6 0.2 —8.4
0.1SH 17.5 —7.9 —3.3 —0.3 -5.9
0.28L -17.6 23.1 3.7 —0.5 -8.7
0.28H —19,4 25.4 2.7 —2.1 -6.6
0.33 -66.5 64.9 12.1 -2.4 -8.1
0.28 -25.6 17.4 7.0 0.3 1.0
TOTAL -64.8 98.7 12.6 -4.7 —41.8
PERCENTAGE POINT PORTFOLIO SHIFTS ACROSS ASSET TYPES
TAX TAXABLE CORP. TOTAL TAX HOUSEHOLD
RATE BONDSTOCK NONCORP. EXEMPTSCAPITAL
0.0 1.66 —0.68 -0.36 0.00 —0.62
0.1SL 1.96 —1.09 —0.39 0.01 —0.49
0.15H 1.03 —0.47 —0.20 —0.01 -0.35
0.28L -1.37 1.80 0.29 -0.04 —0.68
0.28H -0.87 1.14 0.12 -0.09 —0.30
0.33 -2.42 2.36 0.44 -0.09 —0.29
0.28 -1.81 1.23 0.50 0.02 0.07
TOTAL —0.55 0.83 0.11 —0.04 -0.35
PORTFOLIO SHIFTS ACROSS HOUSEHOLD CLASSES
STOCKNONCOR?.EXEMPTSCAPITAL
—0.31 —0.17 0.01 0.05
—1.19 —0.38 0.07 0.00
-1.06 —0.22-0.01 —0.01
0.93 0.11 0.01 —0.02
0.14 0.04 -0.45 —0.03
1.65 0.41-0.19 —0.03
-0.17 0.20 0.55 0.0439
Table 4:
Impact of Capital Gains Cut on Federal Deficit,
the Taxable Bond Rate and Capital Stocks
(bil. of $andbasis points)
No Payout ResDonse Payout Response
g'—0.18 g'—O.29g'—0.41 g'—O.18 g'—0.29 g'—0.41
Federal Deficit
Pure Static 4.2 5.8 6.8 4.2 5.8 6.8
Modified Static -1.2 1.9 3.8 -0.2 3.0 5.0
Dynamic -0.3 2.3 3.9 1.2 3.8 5.5
Taxable Bond Rate 7 6 5 7 5 4
Capital
Corporate 46 39 34 36 32 28
Noncorporate 12 12 12 12 13 12
Household -55 -49 -43 -45 -42 37


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































PORTFOLIO SHIFTS ACROSS ASSET TYPES
CORP. TOTAL TAX HOUSEHOLD
STOCK NONCORP. EXEMPTS CAPITAL
-0.64-0.42 0.00-0.71
—0.77-0.45 —0.01-1.08
—0.23 —0.21 —0.03-0.31 1.29 0.26-0.03-0.43 0.98 0.17 —0.03-0.44 1.98 0.48 —0.07 —0.13
1.12 0.54 0.02 0.08
0.72 0.11 —0.03 —0.40
PORTFOLIOSHIFTS ACROSS HOUSEHOLD CLASSES
CORP. TOTAL TAXHOUSEHOLD
STOCK NONCORP. EXEMPTSCAPITAL -0.31 —0.19 0.00 0.06
—0.92 —0.43 —0.03 —0.18
—0.85 —0.24 —0.09 0.01
0.72 0.09 —0.01 0.06
0.10 0.08 —0.11 —0.08
1.43 0.46 —0.17 0.08
—0.18 0.23 0.41 0.05
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4i
TABLE 5-3:IMPACT ON INCOME ANDTAXES,DIFFERENCES FROM 1986 IN MILLIcN $
(G'= 0.29, PAYOUT 0.56)












POST TAX PRETAX CORPINDIV RR PAYFEDERAL I Y TAXESTAXES TAXES TAXES INTEREST -607-1135-394 -135 0 0 -922-2090 —999 -169 —24 0 -763-1386 -517 -105 -13 0 248 641 384 10 —405 0 485 927 572 -129-1183 0 1166 3216 1975 75-2281 0 430 653 543 —321 —1299 0 37* 828*1564 -773-5205 0 803*
*IN THE ABSENSE OF ROUNDING ERRORS, THE IMPACTS ON PRETAXIAND FEDERAL INTERESTWOULD BE EQUAL AND THE CHANGE IN POST TAX Y WOULD BE ZERO.
TABLE 5-4: PORTFOLIO SHIFTS IN RESPONSE TO GAINS TAX CUT, BILLIONS OF
DOLLARS ANDPERCENTAGE POINTS(G'= 0.29, PAYOUT 0.56)
TAX TAXABLE COP.?. TOTAL TAXHOUSEHOLD
RATE BONDSTOCKNONCORP.EXEMPTS 0.0 14.2 —5.1 —3.4 0.0 -5.7 0.1SL 39.6-13.2 —7.7 —0.2 0.15H 13.5 —3.9 —3.7 —0.5 -5.4 0.28L —13.4 16.0 3.2 —0.4 0.28H -15.0 21.7 3.7 —0.8 —9.7 0.33 -62.1 54.4 13.1 —1.8 -3.6 0.28 —24.9 15.8 7.6 0.3


























































































TABLE 5-5: WELFARZCHANGESBYTAX AND INCOMECLASSES





























































INCOME CLASSES:SINGLE ANt)OTHER FILERS
INC. PRETAX INDIV CORP IMPLICIT RISK PRICE TOTAL% CHANGE
BRACKETITAXES(-) TAXES(-) TAXES(-) (-) (-) WELFAREIN TOTAL
< 10-241.1 47.9 72.7 0.0165.4 —0.5 44.4 3.03
10 — 20-730.9118.1382.7 8.3361.2 -4.7 135.1 3.08
20 — 30-490.2 33.1 181.2 12.7242.7 —21.7 —41.4 —0.02
30 — 50412.7 —52.8—281.4351.1—381.3 —29.6 18.5 0.01
50 —1001493.0-167.8—803.5928.0-986.7 —20.9440.8 0.14
100—2001016.8 11.8-644.6821.7—825.9-25.8352.7 3,34
> 200 183.2 86.1—187.7 553.3—343.0 —19.4271.9 0.61.































Impact of Capital Gains Tax Cut on the Taxable Bond Rate, BusinessCapital
and Welfare (Risk-adjusted After-all-taxes Income)
(basis points and bil. of $)
No Payout Rnrn, Payout Rnrn
g'—O.lS g'—0.29 g'—0.41 g'—O.18g'—0.29g'—Q.4].
Percentage Increase






State & Local Capital
Change in Welfare
Owing to Changes in:












Pretax Income 0.76 0.83
Explicit Taxes -0.81 -0.79
0.93 1.07 0.98 0.93
Implicit TaxesonRealiz.7.17 5.21
-1.07 -1.05 -1.02

















Welfare Changes by Tax Bracket and Income Class
(billions of $)
Households
(millions) g'—0.18 g'—0.29 g—0.4l

























0.0 22.7 0.04 0.1.0
0.15 41.6 -0.15 0.34
0.28 19.9 1.43 -0.27
0.33 6.6 2.14 -1.16
0.28 0.5 1.01 -0.18
Total 91.4 4.46 2.82 2.36 1.39 -0.43 -1.16
Income
<10 12.6 0.01 0.04 0.09 0.03 0.06 0.08
10-20 21.8 0.09 0.15 0.30 0.20 0.21 0.26
20-30 20.8 -0.13 0.12 0.38 -0.26 -0.14 -0.06
30-50 20.1 0.30 0.15 0.65 -0.13 -0.22 -0.27
50-100 13.2 1.46 0.77 0.32 0.42 -0.40 -0.88
100-200 2.1 1.28 0.74 0.34 0.49 -0.01 -0.11
>200 0.7 1.46 0.85 0.27 0.64 0.08 -0.189 Gains
Tax Rate
43










Figure 2: Corporate Payout Function and Efficiency Loss
A
*
0
Cost
B
DIVCOST
Dividend